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Is Innocence Sufficient? An Essay on the
U.S. Supreme Court's Continuing Problems with
Federal Habeas Corpus and the Death Penalty
JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN*
In October, 1992, during the first session of the U.S. Supreme Court's new
Term,' the Court heard oral arguments in Herrera v. Collins,2 a major death-
penalty case. In Herrera, the Court was asked to decide, for the first time,
whether a death-row inmate's claim of actual innocence, not linked to any
particular procedural errors that might have occurred during the inmate's state
trial or appellate litigation, may serve as the basis for a grant of federal
habeas corpus relief.
Later in the Term, the Court will hear oral arguments in Withrow v.
Williams,3 a major habeas corpus case. Williams represents the Court's
second attempt in less than a year to redefine the standard of review to be
used by a federal habeas court in reexamining a so-called "mixed" (fact-and-
law) constitutional issue that was previously decided by a state court.4 On
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; Visiting Professor, 1992-93,
University of Virginia School of Law.
I. In 1992, Congress considered several proposals to amend the federal statute that authorizes
habeas review of state criminal convictions, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The habeas proposals, along with others
covering a variety of criminal law issues, including gun control and the federal death penalty, failed to
pass. See Bush's Assasmation of the Brady Bill, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 1992, at A23.
Although these habeas reform proposals would have greatly altered the terrain of federal habeas
described in this Essay, and although the proposals (or others like them) may reappear in future
congressional sessions, I have chosen to ignore them. The U.S. Supreme Court itself has referred to the
"Court's historic willingness to overturn or modify its earlier views of the scope of the writ, even where
the statutory language authorizing judicial action has remained unchanged." Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72, 81 (1977). Until and unless Congress finally acts, the Court will undoubtedly continue to define
the nature and scope of federal habeas, relatively unfettered by traditional notions of statutory
construction or legislative intent.
2. 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993), aff'g 954 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1992). For an assessment of Herrera, see
Author's Epilogue, infra text accompanying notes 80-87.
3. 944 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1664 (1992) (No. 91-1030).
4. In Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985), a habeas case involving the "mixed" issue of the
voluntariness of a defendant's confession, the Court acknowledged that "an unbroken line of cases
forecloses the conclusion that the 'voluntanness' of a confession merits something less than
independent federal consideration." Id. at 112. These "mixed" issues constitute the most significant
category of federal issues on which a habeas court, at present, remains free to reverse the previous ruling
of a state court with which it disagrees. In the context of factual issues, by contrast, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)
requires deference to prior state-court adjudications; in the context of legal issues, a habeas court is free
to reverse a conviction only if the state court erred under the federal law that was clearly applicable at
the time of the state proceeding. See Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
288 (1989).
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June 19, 1992, the Court announced its judgment in Wright v. West,5 another
habeas case posing the same standard-of-review question. Although all nine
Justices agreed in West that the lower court's grant of habeas relief should be
overturned, and that the petitioner's state conviction should be upheld, no
opinion was joined by more than three of the Justices. In all, the Justices
wrote five separate opinions in West,6 mostly for the purpose of discussing
the appropriate standard of review.
Although it may not appear so at first glance, Herrera and Williams are in
fact closely related. The two cases both spring from the same historical
source-the Supreme Court's adoption, in the late 1970s, of an essentially
process-oriented approach to interpreting the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause.7 Ever since the Court made the fundamental
(and, I believe, misguided) jurisprudential choice to treat the Eighth
Amendment as a "super due process clause,"8 rather than as an invitation for
the federal courts. to review the merits of individual state-imposed death
sentences, the Court has struggled to resolve the tension between a narrow
focus on death-penalty procedures and the (substantive) view that federal
judges have a responsibility to prevent state-imposed death sentences from
being carried out when such sentences are undeserved.
This struggle has taken place in two separate arenas-the law of the death
penalty under the Eighth Amendment and the law of federal habeas corpus.
In the Eighth Amendment arena, the Court's process orientation has triggered
a doctrinal explosion, as the Court searches for perfect death-penalty
procedures that can guarantee a perfect result.9 In the habeas arena, the
5. 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992).
6. Justice Thomas announced the opinion of the Court, and wrote an opinion joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, in which he suggested that, although it was not essential to a
reversal of the grant of habeas relief in West, the logic of Teague, 489 U.S. 288, might support a
deferential habeas standard of review for "mixed" issues. West, 112 S. Ct. at 2484. Justice O'Connor,
joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, argued that Teague had nothing to do with "deference" to
state-court adjudication, and that rejection of the de novo standard of review would be a substantial and
unwarranted change in habeas law. Id. at 2493 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice
Kennedy agreed that Teague was not about "deference," and thought the existence of Teague actually
supported de novo review of "mixed" issues, but declined to resolve the standard-of-review question.
Id. at 2498 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Souter felt that Teague itself required
reversal in West, without regard to the proper habeas standard of review. Id. at 2500 (Souter, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Finally, Justice White, in a one-sentence concurrence, simply found the
lower court's grant of habeas relief inappropriate, without mentioning the standard-of-review question.
Id. at 2493 (White, J., concurring).
7. The Eighth Amendment reads, in full: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
8. See Margaret J. Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for
Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1143, 1148 (1980).
9. See, e.g., cases cited and discussed infra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
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Court, motivated in large part by the growth of Eighth Amendment law, has
restricted the availability of habeas relief in all cases, whether capital or
noncapital, on a variety of procedural grounds.'0 These procedural habeas
restrictions, however, often can be avoided (and habeas relief obtained) if a
petititoner can present a colorable claim of actual innocence."
Thus, by a bizarre and convoluted path, the Court has reached the
conclusion that the substantive merits of a death-row inmate's case are
relevant to the disposition of his habeas petition. But the relevance is indirect
and limited-actual innocence is sometimes a necessary, but (at least
presently) never a sufficient, condition for a grant of habeas relief.2
Seen against this jurisprudential background, Herrera and Williams are flip
sides of the same coin. On the one hand, Herrera tests the bounds of the
Court's determination to stick with a process-oriented approach to the Eighth
Amendment. In the special realm of death-penalty law, a claim of actual
innocence surely gives rise to the most compelling of all possible arguments
that the Eighth Amendment has case-specific substantive significance.
Williams, on the other hand, provides the Court with an opportunity to
continue the gradual transformation of federal habeas corpus from a remedy
for all constitutional errors into a vehicle for evaluating the substantive merits
of a state prisoner's case-whether those merits are measured in terms of
actual innocence (in the typical, noncapital criminal case, such as West and
Williams) or the moral deservedness of a prisoner's death sentence. As I will
explain below, this transformation of habeas, which was advocated decades
ago by Judge Friendly, 3 is a predictable, and perhaps inevitable, by-product
of the Court's refusal to read the Eighth Amendment as authorizing federal
courts to review the merits of individual death sentences.
Indeed, although both West and Williams are noncapital cases, perhaps the
best explanation for the Court's surprising failure in West to coalesce behind
a heightened habeas standard of review for "mixed" constitutional issues is
the recognition, by at least some Justices,4 that the procedural orientation
10. See, e.g., cases cited and discussed infra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., cases cited and discussed infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
12. But see Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993), aff'g 954 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1992)
(presenting this issue).
13. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments,
38 U. CHI. L. REv. 142 (1970); see also John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance
and Procedural Default in FederalHabeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 679 (1990) (arguing for limited
version of "innocence" approach).
14. I would put Justices O'Connor, Blackmun, Stevens, and Kennedy clearly within this group.
Justice White may also belong within the group--although he said nothing in West to tip his hand, he
was clearly a reluctant supporter of the Court's closely related restriction of habeas in Teague v. Lane,
489 U.S. 288 (1989), where he concurred in the judgment only, and in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302
1993]
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of modem Eighth Amendment law already severely limits the ability of habeas
courts in capital cases to "do the right thing." These Justices may have
realized that if the Court in West eviscerated another major category of habeas
claims by ordering habeas courts to defer substantially to previous state-court
resolutions of "mixed" issues," then the habeas courts might be rendered
impotent in the face of even a clearly incorrect use of the death penalty,
because those courts might be unable to find a constitutional error on which
to set aside the death sentence. In short, these Justices may have preserved de
novo habeas review of "mixed" issues in part because such review allows
habeas courts to reach, in individual capital cases, a sometimes highly
desirable substantive goal-the setting aside of undeserved death sentences.
As long as the Court's Eighth Amendment emphasis remains primarily
procedural, further evolution of habeas law in the direction of making habeas
relief increasingly contingent on the merits of a state prisoner's case is likely.
By forcing habeas courts to consider the merits of each criminal case
(including the moral deservedness of each use of capital punishment) as a
prerequisite to awarding habeas relief, the Court may be able to accomplish
through the reform of habeas law at least part of what it has failed to achieve
via the Eighth Amendment-namely, to empower the federal courts to perform
(at least in a limited fashion) the important substantive function of separating
those state death-row inmates who truly deserve the death penalty, and hence
ought not to obtain habeas relief, from those who do not.
Twenty years after the Court's landmark decision in Furman v. Georgia,16
which kicked off the modem era of death-penalty law, the Court is not much
closer than it ever was to resolving the tension between procedure and
substance in its death penalty jurisprudence under the Eighth Amendment. Nor
is it clear that the Court will ever succeed in its quest for a satisfactory
approach to the federal review of state death-penalty cases. The root of the
problem lies in the simple fact that the Justices are both lawyers and human
beings.
(1989), where he joined the Court's opinion, but wrote separately, apparently to express his lack of
enthusiasm for the Court's position.
15. See supra note 4 (discussing the current limits on federal habeas review of purely factual and
purely legal issues). In addition, the habeas doctrines of exhaustion, abuse-of-the-writ, successive
petitions, and especially procedural default further restrict the availability of federal habeas relief, even
if a particular issue is generally within the scope of a habeas court's review. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 49-54.
16. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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Why does the allegedly conservative, pro-federalism, and anti-criminal-
defendant Court continue frequently to grant review in, and often to reverse,
state death-penalty cases?' 7 Why does Eighth Amendment law continue to
grow more and more complicated, despite the impassioned pleas from Justice
Scalia to simplify and reduce these federal procedural restrictions on the
states?' 8
The answer, of course, is that the Justices are only human. This is important
for two reasons. First, as human beings, the Justices know that they and their
fellow human beings are imperfect-human decision makers will inevitably
make mistakes. Second, as human beings, the Justices (or at least most of
them) care more about reaching the right result in a death-penalty case than
they do in almost any other kind of case that comes before them. Perhaps the
most important task any judge can ever perform is to ensure that the
government not kill a person unless that person truly deserves to die (which
means, under our current laws, that the person is both guilty of a capital crime
and among the most death-deserving of those persons who are guilty of such
crimes). Since the Court is effectively the last decision maker in most capital
cases, 9 and since the Court's decision to allow an execution to proceed is
irrevocable, the Justices (or at least most of them) feel a special responsibility
for the outcome. In the words of Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in
Woodson v. North Carolina, death is "different" 2 -- if for no other reason
than precisely because most members of the Court, and most of the rest of us
as well, believe it is so.
Because they are only human, the Justices (or at least most of them), along
with most of the judges in the lower federal courts, pay much closer attention
17. During the most recently completed Term, the Court granted certiorari, ordered full briefing,
and heard oral argument in seven death-penalty cases, and ruled for the defendant in five of them. See
Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992); Sochor v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2114 (1992); Stringer v. Black,
112 S. Ct. 1130 (1992); Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992); Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct.
1810 (1992). Butsee Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572 (1992); Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514
(1992).
18. See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 656-74 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia argued for reversal of the entire line of cases based on
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), because of "confusion" engendered by the Court's Eighth
Amendment decisions. In his view, for state legislatures, "the lesson has been that a decision of this
Court is nearly worthless as a guide for the future; though we approve or seemingly even require some
sentencing procedure today, we may well retroactively prohibit it tomorrow." Walton, 497 U.S. at 668.
19. In at least some capital cases, a state's governor or other executive official may choose to
exercise, or decline to exercise, the commutation power even after the Supreme Court has rendered final
judgment on the case.
20. The "qualitative difference" between death and all other penalties requires a greater degree of
"reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case." Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion).
1993]
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to the outcomes in capital cases than they do in other criminal cases. The
experience of twenty years since Furman suggests that, like moths to a flame,
federal judges cannot avoid getting involved in state capital cases-these
cases consistently receive far closer federal scrutiny than noncapital criminal
cases, even in a relatively conservative era and almost regardless of the
particular federal judge's ideological or jurisprudential views.21 And
whenever a judge finds a capital case in which he or she believes an injustice
is about to be done, the judge is naturally inclined to do whatever is in his or
her judicial power (and maybe even a few things that arguably are not)2  to
rectify the perceived injustice.
The simplest and most direct way for a federal judge to reverse the outcome
of a state capital case with which the judge disagrees would be to rule that the
death penalty is unconstitutional (in Eighth Amendment terminology, that it
constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment") as applied to the individual death-
row inmate. But the Court, in a series of death-penalty cases dating back to
1976, has declined to lead the lower federal courts down the path of case-by-
case substantive review of state capital cases under the Eighth Amendment.23
Rather, the Court has done what most lawyers tend to do-it has tried to
find procedural solutions for a substantive problem. One of the basic traits of
most lawyers is an extremely strong belief in the value of procedures.
Lawyers and judges tend to believe (or at least tend to pretend to believe)
that, at least in theory, if a procedure can be improved enough, then the
results produced by that procedure will necessarily be right.
The course of modern Eighth Amendment death-penalty law reflects this
lawyerly overconfidence in the value of procedures. In 1972, in Furman v.
Georgia,24 the Court struck down all existing state death-penalty statutes
because it was profoundly disturbed by the results they produced. The Justices
found the death penalty, as administered by the states, to be arbitrary,
discriminatory, "freakish[]," or a combination of the above. 25 Four years
later, in Gregg v. Georgia26 and its companion cases, 27 the Court allowed
21. See Franklin E. Zimring, Inheriting the Wind: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment in
the 1990s, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. RE'V. 7, 18-19 (1992).
22. This may explain the remarkable colloquy between the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California and the U.S. Supreme Court in connection with the execution of Robert Alton
Harris in early 1992, in which the Supreme Court ultimately barred the District Court (and all other
lower federal courts) from granting any further stays of execution. See Gomez v. U.S. Dist. Court for
N. Dist. of Cal., 112 S. Ct. 1653 (1992).
23. See, e.g., Sochor v. Florida, 122 S. Ct. 2114 (1992); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980);
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
24. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
25. Id. at 310.
26. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
27. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
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the states to try again under new death-penalty statutes. The primary
difference between the pre-Furman and post-Furman statutes was the adoption
of a "guided discretion ' 28 approach to capital sentencing, in which the states
created new procedures and instructions designed to help the sentencer
(whether judge or jury) make a better choice between life and death for a
particular defendant. The Gregg Court apparently felt that the Furman
problem of morally inappropriate death sentences in the states could be solved
simply by improving the procedures of capital sentencing.
In several post-Gregg cases, the Court has confronted the claim that, despite
these improved procedures, the death penalty was nevertheless imposed
against a person who did not deserve it. For example, in Lockett v. Ohio,29
the Court reviewed the case of Sandra Lockett, who (based on the evidence
introduced at her trial) did nothing more than agree to drive the getaway car
for three men who intended to rob a pawnshop.3" In the course of the
robbery, one of the men shot and killed the pawnbroker, but Lockett never
realized that such a killing might occur, and was not physically present in the
pawnshop when it happened.3 ' For various reasons, none of the men received
a death sentence, but Lockett did.32
The Court could have decided that, under the totality of the circumstances,
the Eighth Amendment barred the imposition of a death sentence against
Sandra Lockett. This substantive position was in fact advocated by Lockett's
attorneys (who included Anthony Amsterdam) in both the petition for
certiorari and the brief on the merits.33 Instead, however, the Court chose to
reverse Sandra Lockett's death sentence on a procedural ground, apparently
concluding that the sentencing judge would have reached the right result if
only the Ohio statute had not prevented him from considering Lockett's minor
role in the crime as a "mitigating circumstance[]. 3 4
Similarly, in Godfrey v. Georgia,3 5 where the defendant instantly killed his
wife and his mother-in-law with a shotgun during a domestic dispute, and then
calmly turned himself in to the police, the Court could have declared that such
a case simply was not a proper one for the imposition of a death sentence.
28. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 454 (1985); McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 334
(1987).
29. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
30. Id. at 590.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 591-94.
33. See Petition for Certiorari at 42-45, Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (No. 76-6997); Brief
for Petititoner at 61-68, Lockett (No. 76-6997).
34. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608.
35. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
1993]
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Rather, the Court chose to reverse Godfrey's death sentence on another
procedural ground, apparently concluding that the jury would have reached the
right sentencing result if only it had received a proper instruction about the
statute's "aggravating circumstance" provision that the crime be "wanton, vile,
or heinous."36
In these and other post-Gregg decisions, the Court has struggled mightily
to find procedural solutions to what appear to have been, at bottom,
substantive disagreements with the outcomes of the particular cases. The
Court has occasionally, to be sure, focused its attention in a death-penalty
case on substance rather than procedures. But the Court has done so only
when it could identify an entire class of defendants, subject to easy legal
definition, that it believed should be categorically ineligible for the death
penalty. Thus, in Coker v. Georgia,37 the Court excluded from death-
eligibility the class of rapists who do not kill. Likewise, in Tison v. Arizo-
na,38 the Court excluded certain felony-murderers who do not themselves
kill, defining the class of death-ineligible persons in standard legal terms
based on the presence or absence of "indifference to the value of human
life."3 9 And in Thompson v. Oklahoma" and Stanford v. Kentucky,"' the
Court established that juveniles under age sixteen at the time they commit the
crime cannot be given the death penalty, but those sixteen or above can.
By contrast, in Penry v. Lynaugh,42 a majority of the Court declined to
exclude mentally retarded defendants as a class from death eligibility because
Justice O'Connor, who provided the crucial fifth vote rejecting the substantive
argument, could not find an easy legal definition for the kind of mental
retardation that necessarily renders an individual defendant undeserving of the
death penalty.43 Instead, a different majority of the Court reversed the death
sentence on yet another procedural ground-that the Texas statute prevented
the sentencing jury from giving full consideration to the defendant's mental
retardation as a "mitigating circumstance.""
36. Id. at 431-32.
37. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
38. 481 U.S. 137 (1987). Ton modified the earlier standard of Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782
(1982), in which the Court had held the death penalty inapplicable to felony-murderers who do not kill,
intend to kill, attempt to kill, or intend that lethal force be used by an accomplice.
39. Tison, 481 U.S. at 157-58.
40. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
41. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
42. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
43. "On the record before the Court today, however, I cannot conclude that all mentally retarded
people of Penry's ability ... inevitably lack the cognitive, volitional, and moral capacity to act with the
degree of culpability associated with the death penalty." Id. at 338 (O'Connor, J.).
44. Id. at 319-28.
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There are two major difficulties with an essentially process-oriented solution
to a substantive problem, such as the problem of bad outcomes in death-
penalty cases. First, and most obviously (despite the traditional lawyer's
view), even perfect procedures cannot guarantee perfect results-which means
that procedural law may wind up being pushed beyond its proper limits. If a
federal judge, for instance, is disturbed by what he or she perceives to be the
wrong result in a capital case, and if the only way to reverse the decision is
to find a federal procedural error, then the judge will be under severe, maybe
insurmountable, pressure to find (or perhaps manufacture?) such an error
-even if, in the abstract, the procedures used in the state courts were well
within the range of reasonable fairness. In other words, a process-oriented
solution for a substantive problem can, if the matter is important enough to
compel judicial action, provoke an otherwise unwarranted expansion of
procedural law.
Second, given the first difficulty, the procedural law is likely eventually to
expand to the point where it substantially over-regulates. The primary problem
is that, every time a federal court announces a new procedural rule for the
purpose of overturning a state death sentence with which the judge does not
agree, the rule does not disappear after the particular case is over-rather, it
becomes federal law that must be applied by other courts to other cases. As
the federal law becomes increasingly more complex, procedural errors may be
found in many cases even though all courts would agree that the results of
those cases were correct. In the death-penalty context, habeas courts often
deal with cases in which the federal procedural rules were violated, but in
which the result of the proceeding was nevertheless correct, and in which
reversal would thus impinge on the values of federalism and comity without
producing a corresponding improvement in the basic justice of the outcome.
In such cases, habeas courts face severe pressure to devise and apply curative
methods (such as "harmless error" doctrines) to preserve the correct result
even in the face of a recognized violation of federal procedural law.
Aware of the adverse impact that its Eighth Amendment procedural
doctrines have had on the administration of state death-penalty systems, but
unwilling to dismantle completely the doctrines themselves (because of stare
decisis and the usefulness of the doctrines in setting aside undeserved death
sentences), the Supreme Court has, predictably, looked for ways to minimize
the practical effect of these procedural doctrines.
One such strategy was to create, within the context of Eighth Amendment
law itself, a "harmless error" doctrine designed to preserve some morally
1993]
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deserved death sentences despite clear violations of Eighth Amendment
procedural law. The two prime examples of this approach are Zant v.
Stephens45 and Barclay v. Florida,46 which at one time were derided as
having effectively "deregulated" the use of the death penalty.47
But time has demonstrated that most state death-penalty cases do not fit
within the Stephens/Barclay "harmless error" doctrine, the applicability of
which depends entirely on certain peculiarities of a particular state's death-
penalty statute and/or case law.48 So the Court has turned, instead, to making
changes in federal habeas law as the primary method for limiting the practical
effect on the states of the Court's ever-growing body of procedural Eighth
Amendment law.
Thus, in a line of cases starting with Wainwright v. Sykes,49 the Court has
held that the federal claims of death-row inmates (and other habeas petitioners
as well) are subject to valid state procedural bars arising from the strategic
decisions or oversights of defense lawyers in failing to present claims for
resolution by the state courts (unless the oversight rises to the level of
constitutional ineffectiveness of counsel). Through expansive interpretations
of the exhaustion, 0 successive-petition,5 1 and abuse-of-the-writ 2 doc-
trines, the Court has also made it difficult for habeas petitioners to litigate
federal claims that have not yet been presented to the state courts, that have
previously been rejected by a habeas court, or that could have been but were
not raised in a prior habeas petition. And, in Teague v. Lane,n3 the Court
also barred most habeas petitioners from relying on violations of new federal
rules that were established or substantially clarified after the state courts had
already completed their review of the petitioner's case.
4
45. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
46. 463 U.S. 939 (1983).
47. See Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 305.
48. See, e.g., Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990) (remanding case to Mississippi state
court to determine whether Mississippi death-penalty law is structured in a manner that allows
application of StephenslBarclay "harmless error" law). Even in Florida, the Barclay version of "harmless
error" law has not completely insulated death sentences from federal review and reversal. See, e.g.,
Sochor v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2114 (1992).
49. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
50. See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
51. See, e.g., Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
52. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, reh'g denied, Ill S. Ct. 2841 (1991).
53. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Although the central proposition in Teague did not carry the votes of five
Justices, the same proposition received majority support in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
54. See also Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990) (holding that the Teague rule applies
whenever state courts could reasonably have disagreed over governing federal standard); Stringer v.
Black, 112 S. Ct. 1130 (1992) (holding that the Teague rule applies to new federal precedent changing
or clarifying the method for applying previous federal precedent to state cases).
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These changes have limited the general availability of federal habeas relief
for state prisoners. But, in developing these limits on habeas, the Court has
been sensitive to the need for an exception that permits case-by-case federal
review of the merits of an individual petitioner's conviction or sentence. For
example, in connection with the procedural default, successive-petition, and
abuse-of-the-writ doctrines, the Court has recognized an exception for
particular cases in which a grant of habeas relief is required to prevent a
"fundamental miscarriage of justice."" And Teague contains exceptions for
cases involving (1) new rules restricting the substantive ability of the states
to punish certain kinds of conduct, or to punish certain categories of
defendants, and (2) new rules that are required to ensure "fundamental
fairness," and without which confidence in the reliability of the outcome of
the relevant proceeding would be greatly diminished. 6
Of course, these exceptions apply only when a habeas petitioner can also
point to a particular federal procedural error in his case, and do not constitute
independent grounds for habeas relief. Each of the exceptions can nevertheless
be characterized as focusing the habeas courts indirectly on the substantive
merits of a petitioner's case. As such, the exceptions have moved habeas law
towards a more substantive, "actual innocence"-based approach. In capital
cases, although the Court has recently defined the aforementioned exception
to the successive-petition doctrine quite narrowly,57 the Court's substantive
approach to habeas law offers a valuable, albeit limited, antidote to the
process-oriented view of the Eighth Amendment.
Where will habeas law go from here? What can we expect out of the
Supreme Court in the next Term or two?
The recent changes in habeas law have done much to ameliorate the
potential impact of the Court's Eighth Amendment law on the administration
of the death penalty by the states. Yet there remain two large categories of
habeas claims that are not generally precluded by the above doctrines, and
that still pose a major practical problem for the states: (1) errors in the
55. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,495-96 (1986) (recognizing exception to procedural default
doctrine); Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 454 (recognizing exception to successive-petition doctrine);
McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1470 (recognizing exception to abuse-of-the-writ doctrine).
56. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311-13.
57. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2523 (1992), which defines "miscarriage of justice"
in the capital sentencing context as legal ineligibility of the petitioner for the death penalty under
appropriate state death-sentencing law (rather than, as might have been asserted, the moral inappropriate-
ness of the death penalty as applied to the petitioner).
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application of existing federal procedural law (largely involving "mixed"
questions of fact and law) that were raised by the defense lawyer in the state
courts but were there ignored or otherwise left unremedied; and (2) violations
of existing federal law that were not raised in the state courts due to alleged
constitutional ineffectiveness of defense counsel (currently defined in terms
of "performance" and "prejudice," two "mixed" fact-and-law issues). 8 These
two categories of habeas claims remain broadly available to death-row
inmates, at least in first federal habeas petitions, and can prolong significantly
the course of post-conviction litigation or lead to reversal of a death sentence.
If the Court is ever going to satisfy the vocal critics of active federal-court
intervention in state capital cases, including some of its own members,59 it
will have to find a way to limit these two categories of habeas claims. This
is where the future action is most likely to occur.
As previously explained, the Court's failure in Wright v. West 60 to adopt
a deferential standard of review for "mixed" issues may reflect the unwilling-
ness of most of the Justices to alter habeas law to the point of "deregulating"
state death-penalty cases altogether. The Court, as a whole, does not appear
ready to leave the death-penalty issue exclusively to the states, despite the
fact that a few Justices might like to see that happen."' Thus, although the
standard of review for "mixed" issues was not resolved in West and could
come up again as early as the current Term,62 it seems unlikely that Justice
Thomas will soon find a majority to support his belief in across-the-board
deference by federal habeas courts to prior state-court adjudications of federal
issues.
The Court currently has before it two cases, however, that might provide
vehicles for significant habeas reform. One of these cases, the aforementioned
Withrow v. Williams,63 involves a habeas court's disagreement with a state
court over a particular application of the rule in Miranda v. Arizona,64 a rule
the Court has recently described, at least at the margins, as prophylactic. 5
In Williams, assuming that Justice Thomas does not obtain a majority for his
proposed "deferential" habeas standard of review, the Court could choose to
58. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984).
59. See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 656-74 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that the Court "reexamine our efforts in this area" to avoid
further unjustified interference with administration of state death-penalty laws).
60. 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992).
61. See Zimring, supra note 21, at 13-19.
62. Withrow v. Williams, 944 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1664 (1992) (No.
91-1030), potentially raises the same question.
63. Id.
64. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
65. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306-09 (1985).
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restrict habeas relief on the alternative ground that Miranda violations, like
the Fourth Amendment violations in Stone v. Powell,66 generally do not raise
doubt about the actual guilt of the petitioner. Thus, as the Court did with the
Fourth Amendment claims in Stone, it could hold in Williams that prophylac-
tic, purely Miranda-based Fifth Amendment claims generally are not
cognizable in federal habeas.67 This position was set forth in 1989 in a
concurring opinion by Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Scalia, in
Duckworth v. Eagan.65
The only problem with this approach to deciding Withrow v. Williams is that
the lower federal courts not only found a Miranda violation in Williams, they
also found the petitioner's relevant statement to be involuntary.69 The case
thus involves a core, rather than a mere technical, Fifth Amendment violation,
and Williams therefore may not be a good vehicle for addressing the issue
raised by Justice O'Connor in Duckworth v. Eagan.70 At the very least, the
Court will be required to do some fancy footwork to reach the Stone v. Powell
issue in Williams.
The other potentially significant habeas case currently pending before the
Court is Lockhart v. Fretwell,' a capital case in which the habeas petitioner
claims that his defense lawyer failed to raise in state court a federal issue that
would have been a winner at the time under the then-existing federal-circuit
precedent (that is, the claim would have required the federal circuit court to
reverse the petitioner's death sentence), but that is no longer a winner because
66. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
67. Under Stone, habeas courts are barred from considering Fourth Amendment claims unless a state
court denied the defendant "an opportunity for full and fair litigation" of the claim. Id. at 482.
A closely related issue is presented in another habeas case pending before the Court. In Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 944 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 2937 (1992) (No. 91-7358), the
Seventh Circuit held that, on collateral review, the appropriate standard for "harmless error" in the
application of a prophylactic rule (in Brecht, the Miranda rule) is whether the error "had substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict," see Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S.
750, 776 (1946), rather than the broader "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for constitutional
harmless error that was articulated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Brecht, 944 F.2d at
1370-74. The Seventh Circuit based its holding on the themes of federalism and finality, noting that it
was ultimately adopting a "middle ground between federal review that duplicates the direct appeal and
federal review that is, after the fashion of [Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)], next to no review."
Brecht, 944 F.2d at 1372.
68. 492 U.S. 195, 205 (1989).
69. See Williams v. Withrow, 944 F.2d 284, 289 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1664
(1992) (No. 91-1030).
70. Arguably, even a "core" violation like the one in Williams, to the extent it does not call into
serious question the actual guilt of the defendant, should still be encompassed by the Stone v. Powell
rationale and thus excluded from habeas review. Under this view, only Fifth Amendment violations that
would likely produce unreliable statements (e.g., physical beatings) would be cognizable in habeas.
71. 946 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1935 (1992) (No. 91-1393).
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of a subsequent pro-state change in the circuit's interpretation of the
governing federal law. The federal court of appeals granted petitioner's
request for habeas relief, and ordered the entry of a judgment favorable to
him (imposing a life sentence).72
Fretwell is an interesting case because it involves the issue that Justice
Powell wrote about in a concurring opinion in Kimmelman v. Morrison.73
There, a habeas petitioner argued that he should obtain habeas relief because
his defense lawyer failed to raise in state court a Fourth Amendment objection
to the admission of a crucial piece of incriminating physical evidence. The
Court found the petitioner's claim cognizable in habeas, despite Stone v.
Powell, because it was based on constitutional ineffectiveness of defense
counsel rather than on the Fourth Amendment directly. 74 Justice Powell,
writing separately, noted that the case might be outside the proper scope of
"prejudice" for Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance purposes, because a
victory by the petitioner in state court would not have been based on actual
innocence, but instead would have been an undeserved windfall. 75 Because
this issue was not raised by the parties in Kimmelman, it was not squarely
addressed by the Court majority.76
Fretwell is, if anything, a much stronger case for the application of Justice
Powell's approach to defining Sixth Amendment "prejudice" than was
Kimmelman v. Morrison. In Fretwell, a victory by the petitioner would have
been worse than a mere windfall; it would have been an out-and-out mistake
under the governing federal law as currently construed by the federal courts.
Another way to look at the Fretwell case is as follows: Even if the petitioner
in Fretwell were entitled to habeas relief, what would happen if the state were
to convene a resentencing hearing? The hearing would be conducted according
to current federal law, meaning that the same federal procedural "error" that
led to reversal of the petitioner's original death sentence could occur lawfully
at the resentencing hearing.
Of course, this is precisely why the lower federal court chose the unusual
remedy of ordering entry of judgment in favor of the petitioner, instead of
letting the state try to resentence him to death. Unfortunately, it is also
precisely why Fretwell is a poor vehicle for considering the views articulated
72. Id.
73. 477 U.S. 365, 391 (1986).
74. Id. at 373-83.
75. Id. at 394-96 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Jeffries & Stuntz, supra note
13, at 687-88, 712-13 (agreeing with Justice Powell's position).
76. See Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 380 ("[W]e decline to hold either that the guarantee of effective
assistance of counsel belongs solely to the innocent or that it attaches only to matters affecting the
determination of actual guilt.").
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in Justice Powell's Kimmelman v. Morrison concurrence. The decision below
in Fretwell is so flawed that the Court can reverse it for any one of three
reasons: (1) it can adopt Justice Powell's views about ineffective assistance
of counsel; (2) it can hold that a pro-state change in the interpretation of
federal law occurring after a petitioner's trial or sentencing hearing always
applies retroactively to the petitioner's habeas case, thus precluding habeas
relief;" and/or (3) it can reject the lower court's unusual remedy, and find
the case to be an example of per se "harmless error." Because the Court has
three ways to reverse in Fretwell, the case may wind up being decided on an
alternative ground without addressing the Kimmelman issue.
Even if neither Withrow v. Williams nor Lockhart v. Fretwell turns out to
be an important habeas case, however, the issues lurking therein are important
and very likely to arise again in the immediate future. The extension of Stone
v. Powell to prophylactic Fifth Amendment claims (and others similarly
unrelated to actual guilt), and the adoption of Justice Powell's Kimmelman v.
Morrison views about the Sixth Amendment's effective assistance of counsel
guarantee, would dramatically reduce the practical effect on the administration
of the death penalty of the two remaining major categories of federal habeas
claims. More importantly, these changes would render habeas relief more
heavily dependent upon the substantive merits of individual cases-both of
these changes stem from the basic idea that, in general, certain claims do not
justify habeas relief because the alleged violations tend to be irrelevant to
actual guilt.
In the end, the Supreme Court may be fighting a losing battle. The changes
in habeas law that have already occurred, or that might occur in Williams,
Fretwell, and/or similar cases, are second-best measures designed to introduce
the merits of state capital cases into federal habeas courts through the back
door-they do not represent the needed frontal assault on the process
orientation of modern Eighth Amendment law. As such, these habeas cases do
not hold out much promise of solving, once and for all, the problems created
by the Court's misguided use of a procedural solution for a substantive
problem.
Perhaps Herrera v. Collins78 will force the Court to rethink the grave
implications of its procedural Eighth Amendment approach. If the Court holds
77. This would be a variation on the retroactivity analysis of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
78. 954 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1992), aft'd, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993).
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in Herrera that "actual innocence" in a death-penalty case is sufficient to
justify habeas relief, then it is only a short step further for the Court to say
that "moral undeservedness" of a death sentence is similarly sufficient.79 And
if the Court is willing to entertain that possibility, then the federal courts may
someday be able to spend their time dealing directly with the question of
whether particular state-imposed death sentences are morally deserved. If not,
then the Court, and the lower federal courts as well, may be consigned to the
murky depths of habeas law for the foreseeable future.
AUTHOR'S EPILOGUE
On January 25, 1993, while this Essay was going to press, the Supreme
Court handed down its decision in Herrera v. Collins.80 The decision
strongly suggests that the Court is not yet prepared to hop off the endless
merry-go-round that it boarded when it first chose to interpret the Eighth
Amendment in death-penalty cases primarily in procedural, rather than
substantive, terms.
Unfortunately (for both the defendant and, in my view, the jurisprudence of
the Eighth Amendment), the Court in Herrera never reached the question
whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of a defendant who
makes an adequate showing, based on newly discovered evidence, of "actual
innocence." The Court did not reach this question because six of the Justices
concluded that, no matter what standard might be used to define such an
"adequate showing," the defendant in Herrera could not possibly meet the
standard.8 Thus Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for five of the six Justices,
79. This would effectively create a robust, case-specific, death-penalty version of the Court's
moribund Eighth Amendment proportionality doctrine. Compare Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983)
(using Eighth Amendment proportionality doctrine to invalidate noncapital sentence) with Harmelin v.
Michigan, II1 S. Ct. 2680, 2684-2701 (1991) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) (rejecting
proportionality analysis of Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983)) and id. at 2706-07 (concurring opinion
of Kennedy, J., joined by O'Connor and Souter, JJ., modifying proportionality analysis of Solem v.
Helm).
80. 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993), aff'g 954 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1992). On the same day, the Court also
decided Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838 (1993). Predictably, the Fretwell Court reversed the Eighth
Circuit's grant of habeas relief. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority of seven Justices, based
the decision primarily on Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365
(1986): "[T]he 'prejudice' component of [Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),]... focusses
on ... whether counsel's deficient performance renders the result of the trial unreliable or the
proceeding fundamentally unfair.... Unreliability or unfairness does not result if the ineffectiveness
of counsel does not deprive the defendant of any substantive or procedural right to which the law
entitles him." Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 844. Fretvwell thus narrows somewhat the scope of the Sixth
Amendment's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel doctrine, and thereby further limits the availability of
habeas relief in one of the two remaining large categories of habeas claims.
81. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 869.
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identified some of the practical and legal/doctrinal problems that would follow
the adoption of an "actual innocence" Eighth Amendment rule. Nevertheless,
he proceeded to dispose of the case based on the "assum[ption], for the sake
of argument," that "a truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence'
made after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional,
and warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process
such a claim." 2 Justice White, concurring in the judgment, made the same
83assumption.
If the Court had reached the constitutional issue in Herrera, it might have
used the case to begin the process of "substantifying" its Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. Indeed, a reading of the "tea leaves" in Herrera suggests that,
if the issue were properly raised, a majority of the Court would interpret the
Constitution to require at least a limited federal (substantive) review of a
defendant's claim of innocence. The three dissenters would require such a
review whenever a defendant could show that he is "probably actually
innocent. 8 4 And Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy, wrote in
concurrence: "I cannot disagree with the fundamental legal principle that
executing the innocent is inconsistent with the Constitution. Regardless of the
verbal formula employed ... the execution of a legally and factually innocent
person would be a constitutionally intolerable event."85
The problem is that, given the disposition of Herrera, the Court is highly
unlikely to reach the Eighth Amendment issue anytime soon. Justice
O'Connor, in particular, frankly admitted her Pollyannaish hope that the Court
might be able forever to duck the question:
Resolving the issue is neither necessary nor advisable in this case. The
question is a sensitive and, to say the least, troubling one....
. T]he Court has no reason to pass on, and appropriately reserves,
the question whether federal courts may entertain convincing claims of
actual innocence. That difficult question remains open. If the Constitution's
guarantees of fair procedure and the safeguards of clemency and pardon
fulfill their historical mission, it may never require resolution at all.8
Unfortunately, it should be obvious to anyone (except maybe Justice
O'Connor) that, no matter how good the applicable procedures, any system
that relies on human beings to make decisions will eventually make a mistake.
This being so, the only remaining argument against recognizing a (limited)
82. Id. at 869.
83. Id. at 875 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
84. Id. 'at 883 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined in part by Stevens and Souter, JJ.).
85. Id. at 870 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
86. Id. at 871, 874 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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right to federal substantive review seems to be the Herrera majority's claim
that, "Few rulings would be more disruptive of our federal system than to
provide for federal habeas review of free-standing claims of actual inno-
cence.""7 The Court's federalism concerns are valid, but its conclusion could
not be more wrong. In truth, nothing could be more disruptive of our federal
system than the present world of federal habeas litigation in capital cases-a
bizarre world in which state-court judgments are stayed for years, even
decades, while defendants argue procedural Eighth Amendment issues
unrelated to the factual correctness of their convictions and sentences, and
states' attorneys respond by raising technical habeas defenses similarly
unrelated to the merits of the case.
This bizarre world of federal habeas litigation is the natural by-product of
the Court's procedural Eighth Amendment orientation. It is time for the Court
to recognize the fundamental interdependence of death-penalty and habeas
law, and bring an end to the ascending spiral of technicality and complexity
that currently characterizes both bodies of law It is time for the Court to put
some "substance" back into the Eighth Amendment.
87. Id. at 861.
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